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I. INTRODUCTION

It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law
than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is
still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid
down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists
from blind imitation of the past.
-Oliver

1
Wendell Holmes

The State of Florida is one of the few jurisdictions in this country
whose judiciary strictly adheres to the 19th century common law

* A heartfelt thanks to my family who has always believed in me, and my friend Nancy
Richiuso who, in my time of doubt, refused to let me give up. Special thanks to a group of
unsung heroes, the Law Review candidates, whose research work hours are crucial to the success
of this publication.
1. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
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doctrine of at-will employment.2 Despite criticism that this approach
fails to provide 20th century solutions for modem employment
problems,3 Florida courts have declined to accept any proposed
solutions. Instead, the courts have deferred all worker protection issues
to the state's legislature,4 reasoning that only uncertainty would result
from judicially altering the longstanding rule.' Consequently, Florida
workers have been unprotected from abusive or wrongful termination by
their employers.6
This note begins by reviewing the development of the employmentat-will doctrine in the United States 7 and its application in Florida.8
Next, it summarizes the development of the prima facie tort doctrine.9
The note then examines challenges to the employment-at-will doctrine
based on a prima facie tort cause of action." Finally, the note considers
whether Florida courts would adopt the prima facie tort to limit an
employer's right to terminate an employee at will."
II.

EMPLOYMENT AT WILL

A. Development of the Rule and Its Exceptions

The employment-at-will doctrine is a creation of the American
judiciary. 2 Simply stated, this doctrine allows an employer to discharge
an employee for "good cause, or bad cause, or no cause at all."' 3 The
2. See generally Edward T. Ellis, Common Tort-Based Theories of Wrongful Discharge,
C947 ALI-ABA 381, 383 (1994), available in WESTLAW, JLR Database (noting that "nearly
all states recognize ... limitations" to the strict employment-at-will doctrine).
3. See, e.g., Stephen G. De Nigris, The Public Policy Exception: The Need to Reform
Florida'sAt-Will Employment DoctrineAfter Jarvinen v. HCA Allied Clinical Laboratories and
Bellamy v. Holcomb, 16 NOVA L. REV. 1079, 1116-22 (1992); Debra Greenberg, Note,
Employment At Will: A Proposal to Adopt the Public Policy Exception in Florida, 34 FLA. L.
REV. 614, 630-34 (1982); Amy D. Ronner, Case Comment, Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet:
Tire Narrow Public Policy Exception to the Terminable-At-Will Rule, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 565,
582-87 (1984); Mark E. Walker, Case Comment, Workers' Compensation:Florida'sResistance
to Nonstatutory Limits to the Employment-at-Will Doctrine,Scott v. Otis Elevator Co., 572 So.
2d 902 (Fla. 1990), 43 FLA. L. REV. 583, 591-92 (1991).
4. See Smith v. Piezo Technology & Professional Adm'rs, 427 So. 2d 182, 184 (Fla.
1983).
5. See, e.g., Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club, Inc., 476 So. 2d 1327, 1329 (Fla. 3d DCA
1985).
6. See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 3, at 628-29.
7. See infra part II.A.
8. See infra part II.B.
9. See infra part III.
10. See infra part IV.
11. See infra part V.
12. See Greenberg, supra note 3, at 618.
13. NLRB v. McGahey, 233 F.2d 406, 413 (5th Cir. 1956).
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at-will doctrine was a departure from the English common law which
viewed the employment relationship as continuing except where the
employer dismissed the employee for reasonable cause.' The English
rule on employment had developed by analogy from the feudal
relationship of lord and tenant. 5 As a consequence of this analogy,
courts imposed reciprocal rights and duties on employers and employees
to protect the employment relationship and prevent an unjust
termination. 6
These rights and duties were initially imposed to protect employers
from employees quitting prior to the end of their agreed term of
employment.17 The catastrophic effects of the 14th century bubonic
plagues left England with an extreme labor shortage, and a need to
protect employers from losing workers to their competitors.'" Although
America originally followed the English rule, changes in American
society associated with the industrial revolution led to the creation of the
employment-at-will doctrine and its acceptance by American courts. 9
The second half of the 19th century was a period of tremendous
economic growth in this country.2" Yet, despite this growth, a wildly
fluctuating economy created an increased risk of business failures.-2 To
14. Ronner, supra note 3, at 566.
The employment-at-will doctrine supplanted English employment law. The Statute
of Labourers provided that "no master can put away his servant" during or at the
end of his term of employment and that apprentices could be dismissed only upon
"reasonable cause.". . . The courts determined that when an employment contract
contained the mention of an annual salary, the employer implicitly agreed to a oneyear term of employment unless there was reasonable cause to discharge.
Id. at 566-67 (footnotes omitted); see also Note, ProtectingAt Will Employees Against Wrongful
Discharge:The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1824-28 (1980)
(discussing the origins of the at-will employment doctrine within laissez-faire and freedom of
contract principles); Henry P. Farnham, Annotation, Duration of Contract of Hiring Which
Specified No Term, but Fixes Compensation at a Certain Amount per Day, Week, Month, or
Year, 11 A.L.R. 469, 470 (1921) (discussing the English rule for employment).
15. See Daniel A. Matthews, Note, A Common Law Action for the Abusively Discharged
Employee, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1435, 1438 (1975).
16. Id. at 1438-39.
17. Id. at 1439 n.17.
18. Id. The Ordinance of Labourers, 23 Edward III, c. 2 (1349), followed by a series of
Statutes of Labourers, were enacted to protect employers. Id. There is some indication that the
same restraints on termination were later used to protect workers and curb unemployment. Id.
19. See Madelyn C. Squire, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine and a Social Justice Theory:
Are They a Response to the Employment At-Will Rule?, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 641, 644-48 (1990).
20. See Greenberg, supra note 3, at 618.
21. See Matthews, supra note 15, at 1440 n.23. The economic shifts included falling
prices, three financial panics, and a seven-year depression in the last third of the century. Id.
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protect entrepreneurs, expand industry, and promote the country's
economic growth, courts embraced a laissez-faire legal policy that
incorporated employment law into a developing body of contract law. 2
A key element in this legal policy was the freedom of
contract-allowing parties to define their employment relationship
without government interference.23
Horace Wood, the leading authority on employment law at the time,
first announced the employment-at-will doctrine in his 1877 Treatise on
the Law of Master and Servant.24 Wood's Rule provided that
a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will,
and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the
burden is upon him to establish it by proof.... [U]nless
[the employer's and the employee's] understanding was
mutual that the service was to extend for a certain fixed and
definite period, it is an indefinite hiring and is determinable
at the will of either party.2
Although Wood cited four cases as authority for his rule, none of them
supported this proposition.26 Despite this lack of authority, seven years
later the Tennessee Supreme Court in Payne v. Western & Atlantic
Railroad Co.27 became the first jurisdiction to adopt the employmentat-will doctrine.28 By the turn of the century, the doctrine had become
the prevailing rule controlling an employer's right to discharge
employees.29
With widespread adoption of Wood's rule and a judicial embrace of
laissez-faire economic principles, the employers' freedom to contract

22. See id. at 1440; Greenberg, supra note 3, at 618.
23. See Squire, supra note 19, at 644-45; Matthews supra note 15, at 1441; Greenberg,
supra note 3, at 618 n.39. Because the theory presumed that the parties possessed equal
bargaining power, there would be no need for any outside force to bind either party to the
relationship. Id.
24. HORACE G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134
(1877).
25. Id.
26. See Farnham, supra note 14, at 476; Squire, supra note 19, at 643 ("Wood's rule, as
the at-will doctrine became known, was without precedent, principle, or legal foundation.").
27. 81 Tenn. 507 (1884), overruled on other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134
(Tenn. 1915).
28. See Ronner, supra note 3, at 568. The Payne court held that employers may "dismiss
their employees at will, be they many or few, for good cause, for no cause, or even for cause
morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong." Payne, 81 Tenn. at 519-20.
29. See Matthews, supra note 15, at 1440. Therefore, "[i]n the absence of a written
contract for a specific term, the employment was at will and the employer's freedom to
discharge was absolute; the employment relation was considered to be strictly contractual." Id.
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labor became an absolute power to discharge employees.3" The freedom
of contract theory presupposed that parties to the contract possessed
equal bargaining power.3" But, in 20th century industrialized America,
such equality was illusory.32 Corporations had grown in size and power
to be life-long employers of some workers, who, in turn, became
"anonymous entities" to the corporations.33
The zenith of judicial economic laissez-faire in employment relations
came with the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Adair v.
United States" and Coppage v. Kansas.35 In Adair, the Court held a
federal statute protecting employees' right to unionize unconstitutional
because it imposed an unreasonable restraint on the employer's Fifth
Amendment right to terminate the employment relationship.36 Similarly,
in Coppage, the Court struck down a Kansas statute that prohibited
"yellow dog" contracts which preconditioned employment on
employees' promises not to join a union.37 Thus, the Court's decisions
gave the at-will doctrine, and an employer's absolute power to discharge
employees, constitutional protection from any state or federal
regulation."
The employer's complete freedom to act was short-lived, however.39
Continuing societal changes soon forced courts to abandon laissez-faire
principles and contractual formalism to address "real world" concerns."
The effects of the Great Depression slowly led to the realization that the
State has a responsibility to alleviate adverse economic conditions
affecting the country.4 Furthermore, the measures necessary to provide
relief required some restrictions on individual rights.42 Concerned with
the inability of employees to obtain a fair contract when dealing with

30. See Greenberg, supra note 3, at 618.
31. See Squire, supra note 19, at 645.
32. Id. at 646.
33. Id. at 645.
34. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
35. 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
36. Adair, 208 U.S. at 172, 180. " 'It is a part of every man's civil rights that he be left
at liberty to refuse business relations with any person whomsoever, whether the refusal rests
upon reason, or is the result of whim, caprice, prejudice, or malice. With his reasons neither the
public nor third persons have any legal concern.' "Id. at 173 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT

278 (1880)).
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
.42.

Coppage, 236 U.S. at 26.
See Note, supra note 14, at 1826.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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powerful employers, the United States Supreme Court in NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp.43 began to limit the power of employers to
freely discharge employees."
In Jones & Laughlin, the Court upheld the National Labor Relations
Act45 which protected employees' right to unionize from employer
harassment or intimidation.4 6 While leaving the at-will doctrine intact,
the Court recognized that Congress had the authority to protect
employees' right to organize for collective bargaining agreements with
their employer. 47 Examining employment contract rights from a public
policy viewpoint, the Court concluded that Congress could limit an
employer's right to discharge employees because of a superseding public
interest.4 8 Subsequently, many states enacted additional statutory
provisions that limited an employer's absolute right to discharge an
employee at-will.4 9
Because the at-will doctrine was judicially created, some state courts
began to use the common law to limit the employers' absolute right to
discharge employees."' Generally, these common law modifications fall
into three categories: (1) finding that an employer has a duty to
terminate an employee only in good faith," (2) finding implied contract
terms in employers' handbooks and policy manuals that protect

43. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). Although the decision did not alter the at-will doctrine, it marked
the beginning of judicial acceptance of government intervention in the workplace. See Ronner,
supra note 3, at 569.
44. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 33.
45. National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988 & Supp. V
1993).
46. See Greenberg, supra note 3, at 619-21.
47. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 33.
48. Id. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. was the fourth largest producer of steel in the United
States. Id. at 26. Its steelworkers had brought suit for discriminatory labor practices, alleging that
the company was firing workers for being members of a union. id. at 22. Concerned that labor
difficulties could cripple steel manufacturing while the nation was beginning to recover from the
Depression, the Court determined that the public interest in maintaining a free flow of commerce
could require a limitation on an employer's unfettered discretion to fire employees. Id. at 30-33.
49. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 295.14(1)-(2) (1993) (prohibiting discharge based on military
service); FLA. STAT. § 532.04(2) (1993) (prohibiting discharge based on employee's refusal to
authorize employer to deposit wages directly); FLA. STAT. § 760.10 (1993) (prohibiting discharge
based on race, color, age, sex, religion, national origin, handicap, or marital status). Further
support can be found in the Florida Constitution. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6 (prohibiting
discharge based on union activity or refusal to participate in union activity).
50. See cases cited infra notes 51-53.
51. See, e.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 374 (Cal. 1988); Fortune v.
National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1256 (Mass. 1977); K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock,
732 P.2d 1364, 1370-72 (Nev. 1987).
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employee job rights," and (3) finding a public policy exception to the
general employment rule. 3 The most significant and widely accepted
common law limitation has been the public policy exception. 4
Public policy exceptions to the at-will doctrine allow an employee
to bring a wrongful discharge claim against the employer based either
in contract or tort. Recovery is allowed in tort when a court
determines that an employer has discharged an employee in violation of
established public policy.56 While defining public policy often proves
elusive," courts have identified three general circumstances where
discharging an employee violates public policy. These circumstances
include an employee's refusal to commit an unlawful or criminal act,5
an employee's "whistleblowing" or refusing to violate a code of
ethics, 59 and an employee's exercise of a statutory right or privilege.'
In each circumstance the court uses a statute to define the state's public
policy and then fashions a remedy to provide relief for a wrongfully
discharged employee.6
Although the public policy exception is the most widely accepted
common law limit on at-will employment, it has been criticized for

52. See, e.g., Staggs v. Blue Cross of Maryland, 486 A.2d 798, 803 (Ct. Spec. App.), cert.
denied, 493 A.2d 349 (Md. 1985); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 892
(Mich. 1980); Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1264 (N.J.), modified, 499
A.2d 515, 515 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985).
53. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1332-33 (Cal. 1980);
Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 551 (N.H. 1974).
54. See Ronner, supra note 3, at 571-75.
55. See Monge, 316 A.2d at 551 (contract); Tameny, 610 P.2d at 1331 (tort).
56. See generally Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20

AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976) (discussing the historical framework underlying prevailing
public policy concerns relating to at-will employment).
57. Courts have held that "public policy" could be found in legislation, administrative
rules and regulations or judicial decisions. Tameny, 610 P.2d at 1335-36; see also Wagenseller
v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1033-35 (Ariz. 1985) (en bane) (emphasizing that
public policy is expressed not only through legislation but also in the common law).
58. See, e.g., Petermann v. International Bd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 26 (Cal. Ct. App.
1959) (employee fired for refusing to commit perjury before a state legislative committee); Sides
v. Duke Hosp., 328 S.E.2d 818, 822 (Ct. App.) (employee fired for refusing to commit perjury),
rev. denied, 335 S.E.2d 13 (N.C. 1985).
59. See, e.g., Tameny, 610 P.2d at 1336-37; Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421
N.E.2d 876, 880 (Il1.1981).
60. See, e.g., Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425,428 (Ind. 1973) (holding
that the retaliatory firing of an employee who filed state-mandated workers' compensation claim
was actionable and unconscionable); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 245 N.W.2d 151, 153 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1976) (discussing wrongful termination by employer to avoid paying statutory workers'
compensation benefits).
61. See Greenberg, supra note 3, at 624.
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offering employees inadequate protection.62 Commentators argue that
employees would receive additional protection if most courts did not
exclusively define public policy by previously enacted statutes and
regulations.63 Consequently, some courts have held that an employee's
discharge can violate public policy although no statute expressly
prohibits the employer's actions.'
B. Florida Courts and the At-Will Doctrine
Although Wood's Rule 65 initially appeared in an 1887 treatise66
the Florida Supreme Court first cited the rule in 1901 to resolve an
employment dispute.67 And, it was not until the court's 1955 decision
in Wynne v. Ludman Corp.68 that the at-will doctrine was "firmly
cemented ... in Florida jurisprudence. 69
The state's legislature subsequently tempered this common law rule
by enacting statutes that limit an employer's absolute power to discharge
an employee." In contrast, Florida's courts have consistently rejected
any common law modification to the at-will employment rule.7 The
courts have refused to find an employer liable for breach of a policy

62. See Note, Protecting Employees at Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public
Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931, 1937 (1983).
63. Id. at 1935; see also Ronner, supra note 3, at 573-74 ("[T]his narrow approach to
modifying the at-will doctrine leads to an extreme reluctance on the part of the courts to provide
redress for the wrongfully discharged employee. Some states merely recognize the exception in
principle without actually applying it.").
64. See Greenberg, supra note 3, at 625.
65. See supra text accompanying note 25 (providing that a general hiring was indefinite
and terminable at the will of either party).
66. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
67. Savannah, F. & W. Ry. v. Willett, 31 So. 246 (Fla. 1901). For a detailed case
overview of the Florida Supreme Court and the development of at-will employment, see De
Nigris, supra note 3, at 1090-95.
68. 79 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 1955).
69. De Nigris, supra note 3, at 1096.
70. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 40.271 (1993) (prohibiting discharge of employee for appearing
for jury duty); FLA. STAT. § 92.57 (1993) (prohibiting discharge of employee for willingness to
testify under judicial subpoena); FLA. STAT. § 104.081 (1993) (prohibiting discharge of
employee for voting or failing to vote in an election); FLA. STAT. § 112.3187(8) (1993)
(prohibiting discharge of public employee for "whistleblowing"); FLA. STAT. § 440.205 (1993)
(prohibiting discharge of employee for asserting a claim for workers' compensation benefits);
FLA. STAT. § 448.102 (1993) (prohibiting discharge of employee in privately owned business
for "whistleblowing").
71. See, e.g., Smith v. Piezo Technology & Professional Adm'rs, 427 So. 2d 182, 184
(Fla. 1983) (holding that the Florida workers' compensation law section governing coercion of
employees created a statutory wrongful discharge action for an employee fired for pursuing a
workers' compensation claim).
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manual's provisions," and have not implied a duty of good faith and
fair dealing in the at-will employment relationship.73 Thus, the courts
have not recognized any public policy exceptions to the rule beyond
those defined by the state's legislature.74
Further, to merit judicial recognition as a legislative public policy
exception, the courts have required that state statutes clearly indicate the
legislature's intent to narrow the scope of the at-will rule. Thus, in
Catania v. Eastern Airlines,75 an appellate court held that a "right to
work" statute76 did not express a public policy that prevented an
employer from discharging employees at-will.77 Although the statute
expressed a need to protect an employee's right to work,78 the court
rejected an employee's claim that the statute imposed a duty on
employers to discharge employees only for just cause.7 9 Instead, the
court found the statute's general language inadequate to impose a
specific duty that was contrary to the at-will doctrine." The Catania

72. See, e.g., Lurton v. Muldon Motor Co., 523 So. 2d 706, 709 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).
73. See, e.g., Kelly v. Gill, 544 So. 2d 1162, 1164 (5th DCA), rev. denied, 553 So. 2d
1165 (Fla. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1029 (1990); Muller v. Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427
So. 2d 266, 270 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982).
74. See, e.g., Aszkenas v. J.B. Robinson Jewelers, 560 So. 2d 1193, 1194 (Fla. 3d DCA
1990) (upholding employee discharge for sitting on a federal jury); Jarvinen v. HCA Allied
Clinical Lab., 552 So. 2d 241, 242 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (upholding employee discharge for
testifying against employer at trial); Ochab v. Morrison, Inc., 517 So. 2d 763,764 (Fla. 2d DCA
1987) (upholding employee discharge for refusing to violate state dram shop laws).
75. 381 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). In Catania, former airline pilots brought suit
against Eastern alleging wrongful discharge. Id. at 266. The pilots claimed compensatory and
punitive damages in tort based on violation of public policy and intentional infliction of mental
and emotional distress. Id.
76. FLA. STAT. § 447.01 (1979) which provided in relevant part:
(1) Because of the activities of labor unions affecting the economic conditions
of the country and the state, . . . it is the sense of the Legislature that such
organizations affect the public interest and are charged with a public use. The
working man, unionist or nonunionist, must be protected. The right to work is the
right to live.
(2) It is here now declared to be the policy of the state.., to regulate the
activities and affairs of labor unions....
Id.
77. Catania,381 So. 2d at 267.
78. See supra note 76 for the text of the statute,
79. Catania,381 So. 2d at 267.
80. Id. "We reject the plaintiffs' invitation to be a 'law giver' in this case .... Not every
violation of public policy is a tort in the absence of an allegation of acts constituting a breach
of the plaintiffs' legal rights and causing injury to the plaintiffs' person, property or reputation."
Id.
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court's refusal to recognize a public policy exception to the at-will
doctrine was consistent with the Florida Supreme Court's holding in
DeMarco v. Publix Super Markets.8

In DeMarco, a former employee claimed he was wrongfully
discharged after he filed suit against his employer on his daughter's
behalf.82 In his appeal to the court the employee argued that, by
terminating his employment, defendant had violated his constitutional
right of access to the courts.83 The court disagreed and held that the
state's constitution did not provide a civil cause of action for
interference with the right of access to the state's courts.84 In accepting
the lower court's reasoning, the DeMarco court affirmed that, absent a
clear indication otherwise, the employment-at-will rule prevents
employees from maintaining an action for wrongful discharge against an
employer."
The decisions in Cataniaand DeMarco reflect the state courts' strict
doctrinal approach to the employment relationship. This approach
supports the parties' freedom of contract and refuses to recognize limits
to the at-will employment rule, as would have been the case if the court
had established a common law tort for retaliatory discharge.s6 However,
this strict approach does allow a tort action where the legislature has
expressly limited the at-will employment rule, as the Florida Supreme
Court explained
87
Administrators.

in Smith v. Piezo Technology & Professional

In Smith, the Florida Supreme Court held that Florida Statutes

81. 384 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1980).
82. Id. The employee's daughter suffered a severe eye injury when a soda bottle exploded
while she was shopping with her mother at a Publix supermarket. See DeMarco v. Publix Super
Mkts., 360 So. 2d 134, 135 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). Once the employee had filed the suit, Publix
told him either to withdraw the suit or be fired. Id. The employee refused and was fired. Id.
83. DeMarco,384 So. 2d at 1253-54. The Florida Constitution provides: 'The courts shall
be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale,
denial or delay." FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
84. DeMarco, 384 So. 2d at 1254; see also DeMarco, 360 So. 2d at 136. The court also
noted that plaintiff's suit on behalf of his daughter was pending at the time the district court
issued its opinion. DeMarco, 384 So. 2d at 1254. Therefore, he had not been denied access to
the courts to seek redress of his daughter's injury. Id.
85. DeMarco, 384 So. 2d at 1254. The Florida Supreme Court noted: " 'The established
law is that where the term of employment is discretionary with either party or indefinite, then
either party for any reason may terminate it at any time and no action may be maintained for
breach of the employment contract.' " Id. (quoting DeMarco, 360 So. 2d at 136).
86. See, e.g., Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club, Inc., 476 So. 2d 1327, 1329 (Fla. 3d DCA
1985) ("[T]he creation of a cause of action for retaliatory firing of an at-will employee would
abrogate the inherent right of contract between employer and employee.").
87. 427 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1983).
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section 440.20588 created a cause of action in tort for employees
wrongfully discharged for filing a workers' compensation claim.89
While noting that it had not joined other states in recognizing judicial
exceptions to the at-will doctrine,' the court acknowledged that the
legislature could temper the doctrine's effects.9 Thus, the court created
an inconsistency in the law-the state's legislature, but not its courts,
could modify the common law at-will employment doctrine.92 Yet,
while refusing to modify the law itself, the Florida Supreme Court has
expanded the relief available to a wrongfully discharged employee.
In Scott v. Otis Elevator,9 3 the Florida Supreme Court held that an
employer who wrongfully discharged an employee in violation of
Florida Statutes section 440.205"4 was liable for the employee's
resulting emotional distress.95 The court began its analysis' by noting
that the common law tort of retaliatory discharge is an intentional, rather
than negligent, tort.96 It then concluded that, because the statute created
a cause of action in tort for retaliatory discharge,97 an employee could
recover intentional tort damages as the remedy for an employer's
violation of the statute.98 Although Scott specifically addressed a
workers' compensation statute, the Third District Court of Appeal in
88. The statute stated: "No employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or
coerce any employee by reason of such employee's valid claim for compensation or attempt to
claim compensation under the Workers' Compensation Law." FLA. STAT. § 440.205 (1979).
89. Smith, 427 So. 2d at 183.
90. Id. at 184. "Some jurisdictions have recognized exceptions to [the at-will] rule and one
exception takes the form of a common law tort for retaliatory discharge. Florida has not
followed that path." Id. (citations omitted).
91. Id. "[B]ecause the legislature enacted a statute that clearly imposes a duty and because
the intent of the section is to preclude retaliatory discharge, the statute confers by implication
every particular power necessary to insure the performance of that duty." Id. (citing Mitchell v.
Maxwell, 2 Fla. 594 (1849)).
92. See id.
I am concerned with the lack of consistency in the law as it now exists in this
state. In this case, we approve a statutory cause of action for the retaliatory
discharge of an employee who seeks compensation for injuries to himself.... In
DeMarco [we] denied the same cause of action to an employee who sought
compensation for his injured child. There is neither a logical nor justifiable reason
for this inconsistency to remain in our law.
Id. at 185 (Overton, J., concurring).
93. 572 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1990).
94. FLA. STAT. § 440.205 (1979). See supra note 88 for the text of the statute.
95. Scott, 572 So. 2d at 903.
96. Id.
97. See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
98. Scott, 572 So. 2d at 903.
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Walsh v. Arrow Air99 followed the Florida Supreme Court's reasoning
when it reviewed another employee protection measure, Florida Statutes
section 448.102.10°
In Walsh, the district court held that section 448.102 provides an
employee a cause of action in tort for retaliatory discharge.'' And,
although the legislation became effective two years after the employee
was fired,"° the court concluded it could apply the statute retroactively
to provide the employee his requested relief."n3 The court reasoned that
because the legislature promulgated the statute to alleviate the harshness
of the at-will rule in "whistleblower" cases,"'" the statute was remedial

and could be applied to cases pending when it became effective.0 5
Thus, by applying the statute retroactively, the court provided the
employee a remedy without fashioning a pure judicial exception to the
at-will rule."° Further, the tone of the court's opinion indicates its
99. 629 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993).
100. FLA. STAT. § 448.102 (1993) provides:
Prohibitions.-An employer may not take any retaliatory personnel action against
an employee because the employee has:
(1) Disclosed, or threatened to disclose, to any appropriate governmental
agency, under oath, in writing, an activity, policy, or practice of the employer that
is in violation of a law, rule, or regulation. However, this subsection does not apply
unless the employee has, in writing, brought the activity, policy, or practice to the
attention of a supervisor or the employer and has afforded the employer a
reasonable opportunity to correct the activity, policy, or practice.
(2) Provided information to, or testified before, any appropriate governmental
agency, person, or entity conducting an investigation, hearing, or inquiry into an
alleged violation of a law, rule, or regulation by the employer.
(3) Objected to, or refused to participate in, any activity, policy, or practice of
the employer which is in violation of a law, rule, or regulation.
Id.
101. Walsh, 629 So. 2d at 149. In Walsh, an employer fired a flight engineer three weeks
after the employee, against the employer's wishes, had grounded a commercial flight because
of a hydraulic systems leak. Id. at 146. The employee brought suit, claiming the employer had
wrongfully discharged him. Id. The court applied a public policy exception to the at-will
doctrine which would protect employees who refuse to participate in employment activities that
violate law or regulations from dismissal. Id. at 147. Although Florida Statutes § 448.102
expands whistleblower protection to cover the circumstances of this case, it was not enacted until
after the employee had been dismissed from his job. Id. at 147-48.
102. Id. at 147-48.
103. Id. at 149.
104. See id. at 148. The court determined that the legislature had passed the measure only
after the state's courts had dismissed similar wrongful termination cases as "a matter for
legislative intervention." Id.
105. Id. at 148-49.
106. In doing so, it successfully avoided a conflict with Florida Supreme Court's
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willingness to view the employer-employee relationship from a wider
perspective than the narrow confines of a strict contractual approach. As
the court stated in denying Arrow Air's motion for rehearing, "[T]he
power of an employer to terminate an employee for doing that which the
law requires, or for any reason clearly contrary to a strong public
policy,.., is not a substantive right based on any concept of justice,
ethical correctness, or principles of morals.""' 7 The court continued,
quoting Justice Holmes:
All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their
logical extreme. Yet all in fact are limited by the
neighborhood of principles of policy which are other than
those on which the particular right is founded, and which
become strong enough to hold their own when a certain
point is reached. 8
But, if the third district court intended to open debate on the
judiciary's strict contractual analysis of employment relations in the
state, the Florida Supreme Court never noticed. On review it quashed
the decision to apply the statute retroactively"'° without addressing the
lower court's comments on applying public policy limits to an
employer's freedom to discharge employees. Thus, Walsh leaves two
questions unanswered: first, does the lower court's opinion reflect
growing judicial dissatisfaction with the limits of a strict contractual
analysis to employment issues? Second, if the judiciary could recognize
public policy limits to at-will employment, how should it determine
whether these policies are strong enough to merit an exception to the
rule?
established precedent of not recognizing a common law tort for retaliatory discharge. See supra
notes 82-98 and accompanying text.

107. Id. at 150 (per curiam).
108. Id. (per curiam) (quoting Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355

(1908)).
109. Arrow Air, Inc. v. Walsh, 645 So. 2d 422, 425 (Fla. 1994). The Florida Supreme
Court acknowledged that Florida Statutes § 448.102 created a new cause of action allowing
private employees to bring suit against employers who dismissed them for reporting or refusing
to violate laws that protect the public. Id. at 424. However, the statute created this cause of
action by changing the existing common law. See id. Thus, the statute provides employees
substantive rights they did not have under the common law. Id. at 425.
While the court recognized that most remedial legislation can be applied to cases pending
before courts, it noted a clear exception. Id. at 424. If a legislative act attaches new legal
consequences to events completed before its enactment, it cannot, absent clear legislative intent,
be applied retroactively. Id. at 424-25. Therefore, because Florida Statutes § 448.102 created
new substantive rights for employees, it could not be applied retroactively to Arrow Air. Id. at
425.
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III. PRIMA FACIE TORT
Unlike the uniquely American doctrine of at-will employment, the
theory of a prima facie tort has its origins in the English writ
system."' In early English law, a plaintiff seeking relief from harm
caused by another had to petition the King for a writ."' If the plaintiff
sought relief for actions that did not fall within established categories,
'2
then the plaintiff had no redress for his injury.
The original action available under the writ system was an action for
trespass."3' The writ of trespass developed in the 13th century as the
remedy for all forcible, direct, and immediate injuries to a person." 4
To obtain the writ, a plaintiff alleged that a defendant caused injury to
his person or property "by force and arms and against the king's
peace."".5 The plaintiff did not have to prove that the defendant acted
6
with an intent to harm."
The writ of trespass provided a remedy where the defendant had
directly caused the plaintiffs injury." '7 However, a plaintiff could not
recover if he was indirectly injured by the defendant's same actions." 8
Therefore, in the 14th century, the courts developed the writ of trespass
on the case." 9 These "actions on the case" provided plaintiffs' relief
for a variety of miscellaneous negligence actions. 2" To prove a writ
of trespass on the case, a plaintiff had to demonstrate that the defendant
acted negligently, thereby causing the plaintiffs injury.' 2 ' As in a writ
of trespass, a plaintiff did not have to prove that the defendant acted
with intent or with a substantial certainty that the plaintiff would be

110. W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 6, at 28-31
(5th ed. 1984).
111. Id. at 29.
112. Id.
113. Id. For a detailed history on the action of trespass, see George E. Woodbine, The
Origins of the Action of Trespass (pts. I & 2), 33 YALE L.J. 799 (1924); 34 YALE L.J. 343
(1925).
114. See KEETON ET AL., supra note I10, at 29.
115. 2 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH

LAW 526 (2d ed. 1968).
116. Kenneth J.Vandevelde, A History of Prima Facie Tort: The Origins of a General
Theory ofIntentional Tort, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 447, 451 (1990).
117. Seeid.
118. See id.

119. Id. Historians disagree on the exact time and manner by which the action on the case
was created. Id. at 451 n.24.
120. See Charles 0. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV.
359, 363 (1951).
121. See Vandevelde, supra note 116, at 451-52.
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harmed by the defendant's actions." These two writs served as
controlling tort law until the middle of the 19th century."2
By that time, a dissatisfaction with the constraints of the writ system
and a movement towards a code system led to changes in the tort
system in the United States. 24 In this country, two competing methods
of organizing tort law appeared."z The first was a rights-based
approach. 2 6 This approach regarded the law of torts as providing
remedies for the invasion of personal rights which are possessed by all
citizens.'27
The second organizational method, developed by Oliver Wendell
Holmes, divided tort law into the three distinct categories of strict
liability, negligence, and intentional tort.' As opposed to the rightsbased approach, Holmes believed that tort liability was imposed by the
State for policy reasons, not moral fault.'29 In constructing his initial
model, Holmes recognized a general theory of negligence, and a theory
of discrete, recognizable causes of action for intentional tort.'30
In contrast, Sir Frederick Pollock, an English scholar, believed that
there was a general unifying principle of tort law.' 3 ' Rather than
relying upon state policy reasons to define distinct intentional torts, he
concluded that there was "a general proposition of English law that it
is a wrong to do wilful harm to one's neighbour without lawful
justification or excuse."'' Eight years later in Privilege, Malice, and
Intent,' Holmes adopted a similar concept that "the intentional
infliction of temporal damage, or the doing of an act manifestly likely
to inflict such damage and inflicting it, is actionable if done without just
' 34

cause."'

122. See JOSEPH H. KOFFLER & ALLISON REPPY, HANDBOOK OF COMMON LAW PLEADING

176 (1969).
Id. at 174.
See Vandevelde, supra note 116, at 454-55.
See id. at 456.
See id. at 456-57.
COOLEY, supra note 36, at 23-47, 64-74.
OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 104, 116-17 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1963).
See Vandevelde, supra note 116, at 458.
Id. at 458-59.
See FREDERICK POLLOCK, LAW OF TORTS IN OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM CIVIL
WRONGS IN THE COMMON LAW 22 (3d Eng. ed. 1894).
132. POLLOCK, supra note 131, at 22. Pollock admitted that he had no express authority to
support his supposition. Vandevelde, supra note 116, at 472. He was simply expounding a
general principle from his analysis of many cases, none of which directly addressed the subject.
Id.
133. Oliver W. Holmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1894).
134. Id. at 3.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
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Holmes' change in thinking resulted from his willingness to
acknowledge a theory he had previously dismissed in constructing his
tripartite division of tort law-that the actual malice of an individual
could be the basis of imposing tort liability.'35 By acknowledging that
an individual's motive could effect liability, Holmes rejected his
previous construction of separate, discrete intentional tort causes of
action and embraced the concept of a general theory of liability for
intentional tortious acts.'36

As a member of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts and
the United States Supreme Court, Justice Holmes began to write his new
theories on intentional tort into law.' 37 Perhaps the most well known
statement of his doctrine appeared in Aikens v. Wisconsin.'38 There,

writing the opinion for United States Supreme Court, he stated that: "It
has been considered that, prima facie, the intentional infliction of
temporal damages is a cause of action, which, as a matter of substantive
law, whatever may be the form of pleading, requires a justification if the
defendant is to escape."' 3 9 Thus, Holmes' doctrine that a defendant's

malicious acts could lead to liability under a general theory of
intentional tort would bear the name "prima facie tort. '
In 1977 the American Law Institute revised section 870 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts to reflect Holmes' doctrine of a general
theory of intentional tort. 4 ' Section 870 provides: "One who
intentionally causes injury to another is subject to liability to the other
for that injury, if his conduct is generally culpable and not justifiable
under the circumstances. This liability may be imposed although the
actor's conduct
does not come within a traditional category of tort
' 42
liability.'
Section 870 describes an analytical scheme to determine whether
liability for an intentional tort should be imposed in specific factual
circumstances.'43 The section states a general principle, and does not

135. See Vandevelde, supra note 116, at 474.
136. Id. at 473-74. Holmes still believed that the foreseeability of harm was measured by
an objective test. Id. at 474. However, he now believed that determining whether the actor was
justified in his acts depended, in part, on the actor's subjective state of mind. Id.
137. See, e.g., Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194 (1904); infra text accompanying notes
138-40.
138. 195 U.S. 194 (1904).
139. Id. at 204.
140. Holmes' doctrine was first described as a "prima facie tort" in Advance Music Corp.
v. American Tobacco Co., 70 N.E.2d 401, 403 (N.Y. 1946).
141. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 (1977).
142. Id.
143. Id. § 870 cmt. a.
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define a specific tort.144 However, to establish a prima facie tort, a
plaintiff must prove four elements: (1) the defendant's intent to injure
plaintiff (2) without justification where (3) the defendant acts to cause
(4) plaintiffs injury. 45
The intent and causation elements are easily defined. A plaintiff does
not have to prove that the defendant acted purposefully to cause the
injury.'" Instead, the element may be established if plaintiff can show
that the defendant "knows or believes that the consequence[s] [are]
certain, or substantially certain, to result from his act[ions]."'47 The
causation element requires
an analysis similar to the one used in
48
evaluating other torts.

In contrast, the justification element is difficult to define, as it
involves questions of policy. To succeed in a claim, the plaintiff must
demonstrate an injury to a legally protected interest. 49 Therefore, one
of the issues facing a court is whether to recognize an injury pleaded by
the plaintiff as a legally cognizable harm. 5 This is a policy decision
which requires the court to weigh a variety of factors, including the
nature and severity of the injury, problems of proof, and how difficult
the injury is to inflict.' Once the court has decided that a plaintiff's
injury is legally cognizable, it must then determine whether the
defendant's actions under the circumstances were justified. 52
In making this decision, the court must again consider several
factors. Here, the factors include the nature and the seriousness of the
harm incurred, the defendant's motive, and the means the defendant
used to harm the plaintiff.'53 In addition to the individual defendant's
motives, a court must also weigh the social utility of the defendant's
conduct."M Thus, regardless of a defendant's motive, the nature and
significance of the defendant's actions could provide such benefits to

144. Id.
145. Id. § 870 cmt. e; accord Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Modern Prima Facie Tort, 79
KY.L.J. 519, 528 (1991).
146. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 (1977).
147. Id. § 870 cmt. b.
148. Id. § 870 cmt. 1.
149. Id. § 870 cmt. m.
150. Id. § 870 cmts. e, f.
151. See Vandevelde, supra note 145, at 549. This is one method to limit the scope of
prima facie tort because, as the Restatement notes, minor injuries incurred in the course of

everyday life should not be a legally recognized injury. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 870 cmt. f (1977)).
152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 (1977) (stating conduct must be "generally
culpable and not justifiable under the circumstances").
153. Id. § 870 cmt. e.
154. Id.
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society that the actions are "justifiable."'55 In these circumstances, the
for any injury incurred as a result of the
plaintiff could not recover
56
defendant's conduct.
Because section 870 requires a judicial determination of public
policy, few states have been willing to adopt the provision.'57 In those
states that have accepted the prima facie tort, courts have promulgated
rules to restrict its use. 51 One reason for the restrictions is a fear that
adopting section 870 would burden courts and potential defendants with
a flood of plaintiffs seeking redress for any injury." 9 Yet, these
criticisms ignore the advantage of the Restatement's position, which
allows courts to dismiss spurious claims by deferring to previous policy
determinations, and to recognize meritorious novel claims by providing
a method to expand existing law to protect new interests 6°
Courts applying section 870 have been conservative in making policy61
determinations that could lead to increased liability for defendants.'
Further, any criticism that the doctrine provides a "blank check" for
courts is unjustified. Courts have historically recognized new causes of
action to meet changing economic and social conditions. 62 The prima
facie tort doctrine merely provides an established methodology to
provide judicial recognition for new and developing claims. 63 The
doctrine serves as a framework to protect emerging areas of interest
without forcing a court to define the elements of a new tort or to
manipulate an existing tort category to "cover" the harm incurred."6
IV. PRIMA FACIE TORT APPLIED TO EMPLOYMENT AT WILL
The employment-at-will doctrine permits an employer to discharge
his employees "for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally
155. Id.
156. See id. § 870 cmt. f ("There are many harms that individuals must bear as the price
of living in a society composed of many individuals.").
157. Courts in nearly half of the states have considered adoption of the prima facie tort. See
Vandevelde, supra note 145, at 525-28 nn.29-60. Many of those courts have recognized it. Id.
Fewer have actually adopted it or found it applicable to the facts presented. Id.
158. See, e.g., Angrisani v. City of New York, 639 F. Supp. 1326, 1338 (E.D.N.Y. 1986);
Porter v. Crawford & Co., 611 S.W.2d 265, 268 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
159. Joseph W. Ginn, Note, Prima Facie Tort, II CUMB. L. REV. 113, 129 (1980).
160. Id. at 122 & nn.69-70 (citing Letter from Professor John W. Wade, reporter for
volumes three and four of the Restatement, to Joseph W. Ginn III (Nov. 8, 1979), which
explained that § 870 is to be used "to provide guidelines to a court considering expanding an
old tort or creating a new one").
161. Vandevelde, supra note 145, at 553.
162. See Ginn, supra note 159, at 124-25.
163. See id.; Vandevelde, supra note 145, at 554.
164. Vandevelde, supra note 145, at 554.
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wrong."' 65 The prima facie tort provides remedies for "the intentional
infliction of temporal damage, or the doing of an act manifestly likely
to inflict such damage ... if done without just cause."' 6 These two
legal doctrines are in direct conflict when an employer discharges an
employee with an intent to harm the employee. This section reviews the
wrongful discharge decisions of the courts which have recognized the
prima facie tort in their jurisdictions.
In jurisdictions where the prima facie tort is accepted, courts have
limited its application. 67 Thus, courts which recognize the
employment-at-will doctrine have generally refused to use a prima facie68
tort to fashion relief for an employee claiming a wrongful discharge.'
This reluctance is demonstrated by the similar rationales stated in the
controlling cases of the two leading jurisdictions recognizing prima facie
tort, New York and Missouri.
In Murphy v. American Home Products Corp. 69 and Dake v.
Tuell,"70 the highest courts of these two states rejected wrongful
discharge actions that were not based on a statutory provision, "being
of the opinion that such a significant change in our law is best left to
the Legislature."'' The courts feared that recognizing a prima facie
tort cause of action would "render near impotent" the at-will
However, the courts acknowledged that the legislature
doctrine.
could carve out exceptions to the at-will rule without damaging the rule
itself.'73
But would a judicial determination that an employer wrongfully
discharged an employee actually destroy the at-will doctrine? When a
court reviews an employee's discharge under a prima facie tort claim,
it renders a decision based on the specific facts and circumstances of
that case. 74 In .determining whether the particular discharge was

165. Payne v. Western & AtI. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on other
grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134, 138 (Tenn. 1915); see also supra notes 13-29 and
accompanying text (discussing the origins of the at-will employment doctrine).
166. Holmes, supra note 133, at 2-3; see also supra part III (discussing the prima facie
tort).
167. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., Dake v. Tuell, 687 S.W.2d 191, 192 (Mo. 1985) (en bane) ('The sole issue
in this case is whether discharged at will employees can maintain a suit for wrongful discharge
against their former employers by cloaking their claims in the misty shroud of prima facie

tort.").
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983).
687 S.W.2d 191 (Mo. 1985).
Murphy, 448 N.E.2d at 89; accord Dake, 687 S.W.2d at 192-93.
Dake, 687 S.W.2d at 193.
Murphy, 448 N.E.2d at 89; accord Dake, 687 S.W.2d at 194.
See infra notes 176-95 and accompanying text.
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justified, the court must consider whether the employee had a legally
cognizable interest in maintaining his job and whether the employer was
justified in discharging the employee.'75
To make these decisions, the court must consider the interests of the
employer, the employee, and the public. 7 6 Thus, a court, like the
legislature, could determine when, and if, an exception to the at-will
doctrine is merited based on "the conflicting interests of the litigants in
the light of the social and economic interests of society in general."'"
And, because the decision would be based on specific facts, the end
result would be an exception to the at-will doctrine, not its destruction.
For example, in Nees v. Hocks,

8

the Supreme Court of Oregon

held that an employee fired for serving on a jury could recover
compensatory damages from her employer.'79 Although avoiding the
term "prima facie tort,"'' 80 the court concluded that "there can be
circumstances in which an employer discharges an employee for such
a socially undesirable motive that the employer must respond in
damages for any injury done."''
In reaching this decision, the court balanced the interest of the
employer to freely discharge employees under the at-will doctrine with
the community or public interest in having citizens serve on jury
"'
duty. 82
The court noted that the state's constitution and statutes
indicated that the jury system was a highly regarded institution in the
"' And, if an employer could freely discharge
state. 83
an employee for
175. See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 153-60 and accompanying text.
177. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 cmt. c (1977).
178. 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975) (en banc).
179. Id. at 516. Because the case was one of first impression, the court did not allow
punitive damages. Id. at 516-17.
180. The court stated that, "We are of the opinion that the term [prima facie tort] serves
no purpose in Oregon and we will advance the jurisprudence of this state by eliminating it." Id.
at 513. The court rejected any label on its actions, noting that it had never hesitated to recognize
new torts when confronted with injuries they believed should be compensated. Id. at 514. Thus,
the principal issue in the case, as restated by the court, was whether the plaintiff alleged and
proved defendant's conduct which amounted "to a tort of some nature." Id. at 512.
181. Id. at 515.
182. Id. at 516.
[Tihe immediate question can be stated specifically,-is the community's interest
in having its citizens serve on jury duty so important that an employer, who
interferes with that interest by discharging an employee who served on a jury,
should be required to compensate his employee for any damages she suffered?
Id.
183. Id.
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serving this institution, "[t]he will of the community would be
thwarted.""' Thus the court, using an analysis similar to section 870,
carved a judicial exception to the state's at-will employment
doctrine.'
Nor would every claim of wrongful discharge under prima facie tort
succeed, thereby "rendering impotent" the at-will doctrine, as its critics
contend." 6 In Lundberg v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America,'87
a Missouri appeals court, using a section 870 analysis, rejected a
plaintiffs claim that his employer had wrongfully demoted him.'88 In
affirming the lower court's summnary judgment for the defendant,'89 the
court noted that the facts the plaintiff-employee provided at trial were
insufficient to establish his employer's intent to injure him."9
In determining whether the plaintiff had a legally protected interest,
the court found that the employer demoted the plaintiff for legitimate
business reasons. 9 ' Thus, the court could find no improper means or
motive of the employer in firing the plaintiff, and no societal interest in
restricting the employer from discharging the plaintiff. 92 Therefore,
summary judgment for the employer was appropriate. 93
Both Nees and Lundberg demonstrate that courts, in a "[d]isciplined
exercise of judicial responsibility,"' 94 could use a prima facie tort to
punish those employers who engage in actions society will not tolerate,
while rejecting claims involving purely private interests. 95

184. Id.
185. See id.
186. See Dake, 687 S.W.2d at 193.
187. 661 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). The plaintiff was a sales manager for the
defendant and was employed in an at-will position. Id. at 668. The plaintiff was demoted after
his sales staff failed to reach production goals mandated by his immediate supervisor. Id. at 669.
The plaintiff acknowledged a personality conflict with his supervisor and alleged that personal
jealousy may have lead to his demotion. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 672.
190. Id. at 670-71. Unlike the Restatement, Missouri requires a plaintiff to prove the
defendant's actual intent to injure the plaintiff, and not simply the defendant's intent to do the
act which purportedly caused the injury. Id. at 670 (citing Porter v. Crawford & Co., 611 S.W.2d
265, 269 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980)).
191. Id. at 671 ("Under an unadulterated 'balancing of interests' process, conversion of
employment relationships terminable at will to employment relationships terminable only for
good cause under the guise of prima facie torts will have to be postulated on facts vastly
different from those presented by the instant case.").
192. Id.
193. Id. at 672.
194. Id. at 670.
195. See Greenberg, supra note 3, at 625.
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V. PRIMA FACIE TORT IN FLORIDA WRONGFUL
DISCHARGE CASES

Would Florida consider adopting the prima facie tort for use in
deciding wrongful termination cases? Given the courts' past contractual
interpretation of at-will employment,"' it seems doubtful. However,
the courts have moved away from this strict contractual analysis and
imposed tort liability on employers where the legislature has specifically
defined exclusions to the at-will rule. 97 The next logical step in a
movement from a contract to tort analysis of the employment
relationship would allow the courts to determine whether employer
conduct in specific situations is justified. The prima facie tort provides
a court the methodology
to conduct this tort analysis without destroying
98
the at-will doctrine.1
The Florida Supreme Court's decisions in Smith'99 and Scott"
recognized that an employer could commit an intentional tort by
wrongfully discharging an employee."' And, the third district court's
opinion in Walsh" 2 indicates that state courts are not blind to changing
social situations that may require a new perspective on employment atwill.203
These cases indicate that courts might be willing to modify their
strict contractual analysis of the employment relationship and, in specific
situations, substitute a tort analysis. However, this change would require
the courts to act independently of the legislature and impose an
additional duty on employers by modifying the common law doctrine of
employment at-will.

196. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 87-98 and accompanying text.
198. Squire states:
The prima facie tort doctrine offers a legal means to protect employee and her or
his interest in a chosen occupation or trade while allowing the employer the
prerogative to efficiently operate a business. Reflection of changes in our modem
policy towards labor and management is easily mirrored in the prima facie tort
doctrine with its "justification" and "balancing of rights" requirements.
See Squire, supra note 19, at 662.
199. Smith v. Piezo Technology & Professional Adm'rs, 427 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1983); supra
text accompanying notes 87-92.
200. Scott v. Otis Elevator, 572 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1990); supra text accompanying notes 99108.
201. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
202. Walsh v. Arrow Air, Inc., 629 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); supra notes 99-108
and accompanying text.
203. See Walsh, 629 So. 2d at 146-47.
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The Florida Supreme Court has previously modified the state's
common law as a result of changing social situations, despite
longstanding rules or legislative action.2" For example, in Hoffman v.
Jones,"s the court adopted a comparative negligence rule and rejected
a contributory negligence doctrine it had adopted eighty-seven years
earlier." 6 One stumbling block to changing the common law was
Florida Statutes section 2.01 which made the general English common
law part of this state's statutory law.0 7
However, the Hoffman court noted that section 2.01 did not apply to
contributory negligence."' 5 Researching the origins of the contributory
negligence doctrine, the court noted that the rule was judicially created
in 1809.2" However, the court found earlier conflicting caselaw that
did not establish a clear common law rule."' The court concluded that
this conflict indicated that the doctrine of contributory negligence must
have evolved from "judicial thinking" rather than "judicial
pronouncement" of the common law.2 ' Therefore, because the rule
was not "clear and free from doubt," it would not have been adopted as
part of the statutory law through Florida Statutes section 2.01.12
Reflecting on the origins of the contributory negligence rule, the
court referred to its previous decision in Ripley v. Ewell"3 where it
had stated:

204. See, e.g., Farmer v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 427 So. 2d 187, 191 (Fla.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 816 (1983) (holding that employee's refusal to submit to polygraph examination was
not grounds for public employee discharge); Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40, 44 (Fla. 1971)
(establishing woman's right to recover for loss of husband's consortium); Banfield v. Addington,.
140 So. 893, 899 (Fla. 1932) (removing married woman's common law exemption from causes
of action in contract).
205. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
206. Id. at 434, 438. The court had specifically established contributory negligence as the
law of Florida in Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Yniestra, 21 Fla. 700, 709 (Fla. 1886).
207. FLA. STAT. § 2.01 (1989) provided:
The common and statute laws of England which are of a general and not a local
nature, with the exception hereinafter mentioned, down to the fourth day of July,
1776, are declared to be of force in this state; provided, the said statutes and
common law be not inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the United States
and the acts of the legislature of this state.
Id.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Hoffman, 280 So. 2d at 435.
Id.at 434.
Id. at 434-35.
Id.
Id.at 435.
61 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1952) (en banc).
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When the rules of the common law are in doubt, or when
a factual situation is presented which is not within the
established precedents, we are sometimes called upon to
determine what general principles are to be applied, and in
doing this we, of necessity, exercise a broad judicial
discretion. It is only proper that in such cases we take into
account the changes in our social and economic customs
and present day conceptions of right and justice. When14 the
common law is clear we have no power to change it.
The Hoffman court then abandoned the contributory negligence rule,
noting that the social conditions that once made the doctrine useful to
society had now changed."'
Thus, the court is not unfamiliar with altering established common
law doctrine to reflect changes in society. As noted above, the
employment-at-will doctrine was not part of the English common law
when the United States declared its independence from Great
Britain." 6 Therefore, the employment-at-will doctrine would not be
considered part of Florida's statutory law. Moreover, its questionable
origins would place the doctrine in the court's category of "judicial
thought" rather than "judicial pronouncement. ' 217 As a result, the
employment-at-will doctrine, like the contributory negligence rule, is a
common law rule the court could freely change or modify as changing
societal conditions warrant.
Employment at-will was a doctrine promulgated to meet changing
social conditions in this country which supported the growth of

214. Id. at 423.
215. Hoffman, 280 So. 2d at 436-37. The court stated:
One reason for the abandonment of the contributory negligence theory is that the
initial justification for establishing the complete defense is no longer valid. It is
generally accepted that, historically, contributory negligence was adopted "to
protect the essential growth of industries, particularly transportation." Modern
economic and social customs, however, favor the individual, not industry.
Id. (citations omitted).
216. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
217. See supra text accompanying note 211. While the court never fully explained the
difference between the two categories in Hoffman, the at-will rule appears to fit neatly into
"judicial thought," as Wood appears to have made the rule up without the benefit of legal
precedent. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. Even if the Hoffman court arbitrarily made
a distinction between "judicial thought" and "judicial pronouncement" merely to legitimize its
abrogation of the contributory negligence rule, no such strained construction of the past is
necessary when the same analysis is applied to the at-will doctrine of employment.
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industries."' Today, however, there is a need to protect the individual,
especially considering the power of the modern corporation and the
disparity in bargaining power of the individual employee.2" 9 Therefore,
following Hoffman it would appear that given egregious factual
situations, 220 the court should act to provide relief, in tort, for some
discharged employees. A pure contractual analysis of employment
relations contradicts the court's guidance in Hoffman that " 'the courts
should be alive to the demands of justice. We can see no necessity for
insisting on legislative action in a matter which the courts themselves
originated.' ,,22' The court continued, noting that " '[I]egislative action
could, of course, be taken, but we abdicate our own function, in a field
peculiarly nonstatutory, when we refuse to reconsider an old and
unsatisfactory court-made rule.' 222 The prima facie tort, as defined
by section 870, would allow the court to meet this goal without
destroying the employment-at-will rule.
Analyzing a wrongful discharge claim under a prima facie tort
analysis would allow the court to recognize and balance the interests of
the employer, the employee, and the public. This analysis would balance
the employer's interest to be free to discharge nonproductive or
disruptive employees against the employee's interest in being free from
the effects of an abusive or retaliatory discharge. As in Nees,223 the
court would recognize the public's interest to resolve any conflict
between the employer's and employee's interests.
As demonstrated in Lundberg, an employee bears a heavy burden to
overcome the presumption of an at-will employment. 224 However, this
limit would preclude spurious employee claims and present true issues
of societal conflict to the court. Using prior legislation as a guide, the
court could measure the public's interest in providing an exception.2
Thus, the court could carve out limited exceptions to the at-will rule
similar to those established by the legislature, without abolishing the at-

218. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 38-49 and accompanying text.
220. See, e.g., Ochab v. Morrison, Inc., 517 So. 2d 763, 763-64 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)
(employee discharged for refusing to violate dram shop laws); Jarvinen v. HCA Allied Clinical
Lab., 552 So. 2d 241, 242 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (employee discharged for testifying against
employer at trial),
221. Hoffman, 280 So. 2d at 435 (quoting Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d
130, 132 (Fla. 1957)).
222. Id. at 435-36 (quoting Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40, 43 (Fla. 1971)).
223. Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975); supra notes 178-85 and accompanying text.
224. Lundberg v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 661 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); supra
notes 187-95 and accompanying text.
225. See, e.g., Nees, 536 P.2d at 516; Walker, supra note 3, at 591.
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will doctrine.2 6
Societal changes have forced the Florida legislature to temper the
harshness of the employment-at-will doctrine. The courts have also
recognized these changes and provided employees relief, in tort, for
employer violations of the legislature's specific exemptions to the at-will
doctrine. If adopted in Florida, the prima facie tort would provide a
methodology for courts to analyze competing interests in an
employment-at-will relationship, define a limited exception to the at-will
doctrine, and provide immediate relief to wrongfully discharged
employees.

226. See supra notes 178-95 and accompanying text.
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